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Abstract—Nowadays privacy in ambient system is a real issue.
Users will have to control their data more and more in the future.
Current security systems don’t support a strong constraint:
policy writers are non-technical users and not security experts.
We propose in this paper to use Decision Support techniques and
more specifically Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis in the process
of authorization policy writing. This research area provides
techniques to inform and assist non-technical users to write their
own authorization policies following the paradigm of Attribute-
Based Access Control.
Index Terms—privacy; authorization policy writing; decision
support system; attribute-based access control
I. INTRODUCTION
Ambient intelligence defines the world as flooded by elec-
tronic devices and computer. These devices are interconnected,
context aware and have a certain degree of intelligence, in
order to make our daily environment easier. Today, this vision
is not restricted to a closed environment like a house or a
building but could open itself on every connected entities
based on existing network technologies and in particular on
the Internet to form what is called Internet of Things.
The success of such a system requires it to be as transparent
as possible. As consequence, information will be more or
less spontaneously exchanged between various entities to build
their context in order to adapt their behavior (information on
users, on environment, on system’s entities, etc.). However,
as emphasized by ITU in his report on Internet of Things
[1]: “Invisible and constant data exchange between things
and people, and between things and other things, will occur
unknown to the owners and originators of such data. The sheer
scale and capacity of the new technologies will magnify this
problem. Who will ultimately control the data collected by all
the eyes and ears embedded in the environment surrounding
us?” People will have to control the access to their information
in a complex and moving environment. Thus, they will have
to write complex authorization policies themselves.
There exist authorization systems that provide both a very
expressive policy language and adaptable enforcement ar-
chitecture like XACML [2][3]. However, the complexity of
the system to control (i.e. the nature and the number of
security factors to consider) combined to the complexity of the
language (e.g., XACML is a verbose policy language) make
this solution not conceivable.
Several research works have been conducted to simplify the
users’ interaction with their electronic security. For example,
the P3P project (”Platform for Privacy Preferences” [4]) has
defined a standard to simplify users’ data confidentiality poli-
cies of web sites to allow people to understand how web sites
manage their data. These policies are then evaluated according
to users’ preferences by ad-hoc mechanisms. Reaching the
same goal, Kelley et al. [5] have proposed an approach similar
to nutritional labels to represent confidentiality policies of web
sites. Inglesant et al. [6] have proposed a constrained natural
language for the specification of authorization policies. Stepien
et al. [7] have worked on a non-technical notation for XACML
policies.
Although facilitating the understanding of how entities will
use users’ data (e.g. P3P) and making authorization policy
language more human readable are mandatory, the global
authorization policy writing process involving people should
consider the following requirements:
• Req1: Users won’t spend too much time configuring their
devices before using it. The classical authorization policy
writing process, which consists in 1) risk analysis, 2) pol-
icy specification, then 3) service usage, isn’t acceptable
any more. It has to be improved in order to take into
account non-technical users.
• Req2: Users shouldn’t be bothered by too many questions
like ”application XYZ wants to access to your calendar”
when they use their devices. Interaction with users should
consider users preferences to limit the interactions.
Decision Support Systems (DSS) is a research area that
focuses on informing the decision maker and giving him
tools and methods to model and understand the decision
and give then point of solution. New trends in DSS design
aim at taking into account the context of the user and the
decision. For example, EUREKA [8] is a recommendation
system for television that 1) analyses what and how people
watch television to dynamically set up the users’ preferences
and 2) proposes adapted TV programs that people are expected
to like. We believe DSS can allow users to write access
control rules more interactively while controlling the number
of interaction, for avoiding users bothering. The goal of this
article is to explain how Decision Support Systems and more
specifically Multi Criteria analysis can facilitate the writing of
authorization policies.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section
2 presents evolution of access-control models. Section 3 in-
troduces Decision Support Systems. Section 4 presents our
approach on using decision support techniques for writing
authorization policies interactively. Section 5 describes the
implementation of our prototype. Discussion and future work
are given in section 6. Finally, we conclude in section 7.
II. ACCESS CONTROL POLICY MODELS
Access control models consider three main entities: the
subjects, the objects and the permissions. Subjects are users or
applications who can perform actions in the system. Objects
are resources or services that subjects want to access. Permis-
sions determine how subjects can access resources. Even if
these three entities appear in all models, their representation
has evolved over time to adapt to requirements of modern
systems. From mandatory and discretionary access control to
attributes based models, we will see that the more their power
of expression increases, the more the difficulty to write policies
for non-technical users increases too.
A. Discretionary and Mandatory Access Control
Discretionary access control (DAC) is presented by TCSEC
(Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria) as ”a means
of restricting access to objects based on the identity of
subjects and/or groups to which they belong. The controls
are discretionary in the sense that a subject with a certain
access permission is capable of passing on that permission
(perhaps indirectly) to any other subject (unless restrained by
mandatory access control)”. Rules are described by a triplet
<user, object, action>. Each object in the system has an
owner who determines the access control policy for his objects.
This approach is adapted to non-technical users because policy
rules are simple. However, such policies can’t handle modern
security requirements such as contextual information.
Unlike DAC, Mandatory Access control (MAC) doesn’t let
users choose permissions of resources. An administrator is in
charge of building policies. Users and objects are grouped in
different levels of security. The objective is to avoid informa-
tion leaks by prohibiting access for a user of a certain level
for an object of an upper level. This kind of policies requires
a specification step before using the system for defining the
security levels. This task isn’t effortless. For example, security
levels in the Bell-Lapadula model [9] are a combination of
classification levels and compartments.
B. Role-Based Access Control
The concept of Role-Based Access control (RBAC) ap-
peared in the nineties at the same time than multi-users appli-
cations [10]. A role represents a job function in the context
of an organization. Assigning permissions to roles instead of
users has considerably simplified permissions management as
the number of users has grown. A single user can have multiple
roles and can even switch between them depending on the
actions he wants to perform.
However, RBAC doesn’t take into account the environment
or the situation of a user. As consequence, extensions of RBAC
have been proposed to overcome this issue [11]. For example,
GRBAC allows defining environment roles [12]. The model
is able to capture the state of the world and described it
with variables. Conditions are made with these variables and
are used to activate or not the environment rules. This gives
administrators the ability to elaborate several rules for the same
resources but in different context.
With RBAC and its extensions, an administrator can manage
a big amount of users and some contextual information. But
an expert administrator is required for writing such policies. In
fact, creating a role hierarchy can be a hard task when using
a role engineering methodology is mandatory [13].
C. Attribute-based Access Control
Roles aren’t always efficient in a dynamic, open and
context-aware system to structure authorization policies. A
new model based on attributes (ABAC) has been proposed.
The administrator is no longer required to add user one by one
but it is still necessary to specify attributes and to define access
rules. Attributes can be used to detail users but also resources
or the environment. All these elements can define the context
of a situation. Context is any information that can be used to
characterize the situation of an entity. An entity is a person,
place, or object that is considered relevant to the interaction
between a user and an application, including the user and
applications themselves [14]. For example, security rules in
CABAC (Contextual Attribute Based Access Control [15])
are described by a tuple <Action, UserAttr, ObjAttr, EnvAttr,
TransacAttr, Perm>. Flexibility is increased for administrators
who do no longer assign permissions to roles but to contextual
situations.
This model is interesting as fine-grained constraints on
contextual information can be specified. It allows writing
complex and accurate rules. But thinking that non-technical
users can write their own security rules based on such models
is illusory. Thus, we propose to support users in this very
complex task through DSS development.
III. DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM
Nowadays, it is common to have to take hard decisions.
Making a good choice requires to be well informed about this
decision. In order to help the decision maker, DSS propose
tools and techniques. The goal of these systems isn’t to make
decisions instead of the decision maker but to interactively
design the decision between the user and the system. The
DSS informs the user about his possibilities and guides him
during the solving problem process. Several techniques are
used for developing DSSs [16]. One of these is based on the
analysis of the decision to make on several aspects. These
aspects are called criteria and the corresponding area is called
Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA).
When people have to make a decision, it is generally
possible to analyze this decision along several criteria. Multi-
criteria Decision analysis proposes tools to analyze and un-
derstand this decision based on multiple criteria. Information
and assistance are provided to the decision maker in order
to capture his preferences. These preferences are represented
by a numeric function called the utility function [16]. Using
this function in the context of Recommender Systems allows
assigning scores to choices in order to rank these choices
from the less desirable to the most desirable. Before building
the function, two conditions need to be verified. Preferences
of the decision maker must be numerically representable and
the multi-criteria function must be decomposable into single-
criteria functions. A multi-criteria utility function has the
following form:
∀x = (x1, x2, x3), y = (y1, y2, y3) ∈ X (1)
x < y ⇔ u(x1, x2, x3) ≥ u(y1, y2, y3) (2)
Where x, y are choices, xi, yi are criteria and X the
set of alternatives. Each choice implies one or multiple
consequences. Decisions are then classified according to the
knowledge of the decision maker. The decision maker’s knowl-
edge is ordered in three categories from complete knowledge
to complete ignorance. When the decision maker has full
knowledge, he knows what will be the consequences of any
action. In this case, the environment is deterministic and this
decision is called decision under certainty. When there isn’t a
total knowledge of the situation, one action can lead to many
consequences. Each of these consequences has a probability
of happening. It is called decision under risk. Finally, when
the decision maker has no idea of what can happen, each
action can have multiple consequences but he can’t estimate
the probability of occurring. This model is called decision
under uncertainty.
As explained previously, it is necessary to be able to decom-
pose multi-criteria function into single-criteria function, easier
to encode. Then encoding these functions allows assigning
score to each function. Encoding is performed by aggregation
function. They are used to combine several numerical values
and for the result to take into account user’s preferences.
An aggregation function can be a very simple mathematical
function like a weighted mean or more complex like a Choquet
integral that is used to take into account relationships among
criteria [17].
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Fig. 1. Decision Support System Diagram
In summary DSS supplies tools to users in order to simplify
their decision-making. Everything starts with choices. These
choices are decomposed into criteria, easier to deal with. These
criteria describe the choice and will allow the system to un-
derstand the reason of the user’s choice. Then the system uses
these criteria and an utility function to numerically represent
the user’s preferences. Finally preferences are aggregate by a
function to build the score that is needed to take the decision.
These scores are useful to propose choices to users following
their preferences and what criteria are important for them.
IV. OUR PROPOSAL
As part of the French ANR project INCOME (Multi-Scale
Context Management Software Infrastructure for the Internet
of Things), we begin to work on an authorization system for
ambient system in charge of the protection of users’ private
data. One of the main constraint is that the authorization
system should be adapted to non-technical users. These users
aren’t security experts and won’t use the system if they can’t
exploit it immediately. At the same time, ambient systems
imply to consider contextual information that will lead to
write complex security policies. Our idea is neither to provide
a new access control policy model, nor a new authorization
system. We want to define a DSS that helps non-technical
users to take advantage of such systems. In a classic XACML
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Fig. 2. Example of XACML Model
system (Figure 2), the user must first write policies (step 1).
Afterward, every access request to a protected resource is
caught by the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) (step 2). In
our example, the request consists in four criteria: the name of
the requester, the action to be performed, the current location
of the requester and the target resource. The PEP converts all
this criteria to a request readable by an XACML system and
sends it to the Policy Decision Point (PDP). The PDP looks
in its policy database if there is a policy corresponding to the
criteria. In our case, one policy exists with three criteria: the
name, the location and the resource. Finally, the PDP sends
the decision to the PEP who translates it into the application
specific language (step 3). When looking at XACML systems,
the PDP has three possible decisions: Permit, Deny or Not-
Applicable. NotApplicable means there is no rule to take a
decision. When the decision is NotApplicable, the PEP doesn’t
know what to do. To avoid this situation, there is often a
default rule in the policy database that denies any unspecified
access or, PEP implements response NotApplicable like Deny.
This approach doesn’t respect neither requirement 1 nor re-
quirement 2. The user has to analyze security to write complex
authorization rules before using its system. In addition, he
can’t be informed about denied accesses if there is a default
rule that denies any access. A DSS can setup an interaction
with the user to help him write the missing rule interactively.
If we look at our example, the request says that John is at
home and wants to read file A. If the owner of file A accepts
this request and other requests where John is always at home
and wants to perform any action on file A, the DSS has to
understand that the criterion action isn’t relevant for the owner.
It won’t be interesting to propose a rule for each action John
wants to perform on file A when he is at home. What really
matters for the owner of the file A is that the requester is
John and he is at home when he wants to act on the file. So
the DSS has to propose a rule with only three criteria: the
requester (John), the location (home) and the resource (file
A).
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Fig. 3. Architecture of our model
In our approach, the user doesn’t have to prefill the pol-
icy database. The user can create policies like an ordinary
XACML system but the database can also be empty at the
beginning. The system starts with the reception of a request
(Figure 3) (step 1). If the PDP finds one authorization rule
that matches all the criteria of the request or a subset, it will
take the appropriate decision (Permit or Deny) like an ordinary
authorization system (step 2). But if no rule is found by the
PDP, it sends back to the PEP the response NotApplicable. At
this point, our approach differs from a usual XACML system.
Whenever the PEP receives the response NotApplicable, it
hands over to the DSS. First the DSS calculates the score of the
request (step 3). This score allows the DSS to choose between
two behaviors. The first one is when the score provides enough
assurance about the user’s preferences. In that case, the DSS
proposes to the user to write a new rule. The second behavior
appears when the score doesn’t give enough sureness. Then
the DSS interacts with the user, informs him precisely of the
request and asks for a decision.
The first behavior applies when the system is sure enough
of the user preferences corresponding to criteria contained in
the request. The system will interact with the user to help him
write a new authorization rule. The system makes a policy
proposal in an understandable sentence for the user who can
accept it, change some values of the criteria or refuse it (step
4). If the user accepts to write a new authorization rule, the
DSS takes this policy and adds it to the PDP policy database
(step 5). Next time a request corresponding to the criteria of
this policy will be made, the system will take the decision
without questioning the user.
The second behavior applies when the system hasn’t enough
assurance about preferences concerning the request’s criteria.
The system must therefore learn more about them and makes
an interaction phase with the user. The request is explained in
an understandable sentence for the user and he is asked if he
agrees or not in sharing the resource (step 6). The decision
(Permit or Deny) is sent to the DSS which uses it to update
all the criteria used by the request (step 7). Then, whatever the
behavior is, when the decision is taken, the DSS sends it to
the PEP which translates it to an application compliant form
for applying the decision (step 8).
We base our work on A. Martin’s research on a generic
recommendation system and uses multi-criteria analysis [18].
In this approach, generic criteria are used to describe and man-
age recommendation objects proposed to users. Each user has
profiles, one for each kind of items. An interactive approach
is adopted that alternates phases of calculation and phases
of dialog with the decision maker to propose him a ranked
list of recommendations. The system has been tested through
an online bookstore application and has showed interesting
results.
In our case user’s preferences are described by criteria. All
criteria represent contextual information. We define contextual
information as all information of a request that can be used for
authorization decision and also the decision. There are seven
types of criteria:
• What information is requested
• What action is requested
• When the request has been made
• Where is the resource or the owner or the requester
• Who is requesting information
• Why information is requested
• How will information be retained
In order to have a first representation of the user preferences,
the system needs an initialization. Users have to answer
questions relating the security of their personal data in real-
life situations. Users have multiple choices for answering each
questions. Each answer will be converted into a score on one or
more criteria in a way that, at the end of the questioner, all of
the criteria will be initialized. As seen in the introduction, users
won’t spend too much time configuring the system (Req1), so
the questioner shouldn’t be too long or the user won’t complete
it or won’t be careful until the end. But the initialization
must cover all the aspect of users preferences. The better the
initialization is, the faster the system will converge to relevant
preferences and will propose suitable policies to the user. And
if the system converges quickly, it won’t have to bother users
with too many interactions with them (Req2). After this first
step, the system is ready to use anytime a request is receive.
Each time a request is received, the system builds its score.
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Fig. 4. The three different zones
The score of the request is a weighted average of all criteria
and combination of criteria. This will allow the system to
understand what criterion is really important for the user in
a request. There are three different zones in the range of the
score for two different kinds of zone (Figure 4). The first kind
is the uncertainty zone where the system has to ask the user
in order to take the decision, the second kind is a zone where
the system is sure enough of the user’s preferences and can
take the decision itself. A request’s score is between 0 and
20, the higher the score is, the less the user is reluctant to
share his private information. The first zone between 5 and
15 is the uncertainty zone. In this zone, the system isn’t sure
enough of what the user wants so it will ask the user to take
the decision in order to improve knowledge of preferences.
The second zone is between 0 and 5 and is the deny zone.
When a score is in this zone, the system becomes sure of the
user preferences, the system knows that the user doesn’t want
to share data in this context so it will propose the first time the
user to write a policy and when the policy is added to the PDP
policy database, it will take the Deny decision itself without
having to interact with the user. The last zone is between 15
and 20. This last zone works like the deny zone except that if
the system has to take itself the decision, it will be permitted.
In these two zones, when a decision is taken directly by the
system, all criteria will be updated (a slight decrease when the
request ended in a Permit, a slight increase when the request
ended in a Deny) to avoid being stuck indefinitely in this zone.
Because user preferences can change, the system has to pass
regularly in the uncertainty zone to confirm or affirm these
preferences.
When a request is received and no policy fits for its criteria,
the system builds the score of the request. If the score is in
the deny or permit zone, the system suggests an authorization
policy to the user and if the user accepts the policy, it will be
added to the policy database and the decision can be taken. If
the score of the request is in the uncertainty zone, the system
can’t take the decision and informs the user of what happen
so he can take a decision. The decision is just “yes I agree
to share these information with the requester” or “no I don’t
want to share these information with the requester”. After that
answer, the system updates all the request criteria’s.
The addition of the DSS allows to understand user’s behav-
ior and what matters him for taking his decision. Returning
to our request’s example where John wants to read the file
A while he is at home. If John makes several requests while
he is at home where he wants to read or write on file A.
Suppose the owner of file A always accepts the requests, the
criterion corresponding to his home location (where), the file A
(what resource) and John (who) are going to increase quickly.
Because the action write or read differs from one to another
request, the criteria concerning these actions (what action) are
going to increase slower than the other and because we use
all combination of criteria in the score of the request, here,
the combination <who, what resource, where> who is always
the same is going to have quickly a higher score than all other
combination containing the action. When enough requests will
be made to be sure of the user’s preference, the system will
propose a policy where John can make any action to file A
when he is at home. Thus the system won’t ask the user to
write two policies, one for him to read and the other to write
on file A. It reduces the number of interactions needed with
the user, the system is more consistent with the requirement
2.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
In order to make experiments, we have implemented a pro-
totype of our system. We have chosen to rely on Android [19].
Android is the world’s most used mobile platform designed
to be open. However Android doesn’t permit dynamic access
control during runtime. We had to modify the source code of
the operating system in order to allow our system to work. All
installed applications in Android have a set of permissions.
Permission allows an application to access to one or many
resources. All permissions for an application are defined in a
file called manifest and are granted at installation. Permissions
are only revoked when an application is deleted. Thus, a user
can’t change permissions once the application is installed. In
addition, the only way to deny a subset of the permissions
requested by an application is to not install it.
Fig. 5. Example of a policy proposal interaction
Our system needs to control and modify permissions during
runtime. Because the Android SDK doesn’t provide tools for
that, we had to get into the source code of the operating system
and change some part of it. Each time a request for a resource
is made by an application, Android checks if this application
has the permission in its manifest, the main modification we
made was to check before if our system has revoked this
permission. This isn’t the only modification we made in the
source code, we also added calls to application for interactions
with the user so when a request for a resource is made and no
policy is compatible with it, a new window pops up to inform
the user of the request and asking him to allow or deny the
sharing . Interaction with user is also needed when the score
of the request enters in the deny or permit zone, this time the
system helps the user write a policy (Figure 5). For more ease,
we also included all the calculus part in the source code so
just after the interception of the request, its score is calculated
and the system can take the decision or hand it over to the
user. When the decision has been taken, the criteria’s update
phase is also done in the source code.
In the end, only interactions with the user and the XACML
part is done on the application side. For the prototype, we
have used the Sun XACML implementation. The request is
sent to an application where an instance of a PEP is installed.
The PEP translates it in an XACML format and sends it to
the PDP who is also installed on the application side. For
the moment, only three kinds of criteria are exploited: The
What is the permission requested, the Who is the PID of the
process making the request and the When is the time the
request is made. The PID of each process is linked to the
name of applications because a same process has a new PID
at each new execution. To easily test the prototype, we use the
android emulator who provides a lot of tools for debugging
and monitoring.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Users will have to control their data more and more in
the future. Current security systems do not support a strong
constraint: policy writers are non-technical users and not
security experts. Our goal is to help these non-technical users
to write their own authorization policies. Users should be
aware of what is performed on their data. As consequence,
security systems should inform and assist users to write their
own authorization policies. Our idea is to make benefit of
Decision Support Systems to help users in this task. We have
introduced in this paper Decision Support Systems and more
precisely Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis. We have presented
how this research area suits this security issue.
We have presented in this paper our model and a first version
of a prototype. This prototype that only considers three kinds
of criteria must be completed. Future context aware system
requires to handle geographic and temporal criteria. The bigger
the number of criteria is, the more the analysis of these
criteria will be (deducing their relationship, taking into account
their diversity, etc). As a consequence, more powerful Multi-
Criteria Decision Analysis are required, such as the Choquet
integral. Initialization is a very important step of the system
that can help preferences to converge faster and thus bother
the user less often. We are currently working on a user study
concerning the initialization. We want to analyze what kind
of initialization will give us the best first representation of
the users preferences. In order to do that, we have prepared a
survey where users are first asked to answer questions putting
them in real life situations. Each of these questions is related
to one or more context element like a type of resource, time or
location. After that, we ask users to tell us if they are willing
to share some kind of resource. We use sliders that goes to “I
dont want to share this resource, no matter what” to “I want
to share this resource in any case” . After these two steps,
we compare results and if some results are totally different in
the two version, a third step begin and asks the user what he
really means. This study will help us to know what type of
initialization give the best results between the questionnaire
and sliders.
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